

# Bankers and Regulators \*

Philip Bond  
University of Minnesota

Vincent Glode  
University of Pennsylvania

October 18, 2011

We propose a labor market model in which agents with heterogeneous ability levels choose to work as bankers or as financial regulators. When workers extract intrinsic benefits from working in regulation (such as public-sector motivation or human capital accumulation), our model jointly predicts that bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more sensitive to performance. During financial booms, banks draw the best workers away from the regulatory sector and misbehavior increases. In a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking mid-career.

---

\*We thank Bruce Carlin, Murray Frank, Itay Goldstein, Piero Gottardi, Rick Green, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Rachel Kranton, Robert Marquez, Christian Opp, Marco Pagano, Amir Yaron, and seminar participants at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Minnesota, the Wharton School, the 2011 Duke/UNC Corporate Finance Conference, the 2011 Conference on Theoretical Research in Development Economics, and the 2011 CEPR Gerzensee meetings for helpful comments.

*“ Does it really matter who is in charge of the regulators? The grunt work of supervision depends on more junior staff, who will always struggle to keep tabs on smarter, better-paid types in the firms they regulate. ”*

The Economist, September 30th 2010

There is a widespread perception that, on average, financial regulators are not as skilled as the bankers and traders they are charged with overseeing—and moreover, that this discrepancy in ability widens significantly when the financial sector booms, or when regulatory resources shrink. In addition, jobs in financial regulatory agencies offer compensation that is low and insensitive to performance, relative to jobs in the financial sector being supervised.<sup>1</sup> These observations raise a number of questions. Why is the regulatory sector less prepared to pay for skill relative to the private sector? Why does this discrepancy worsen when the financial sector booms and how does this affect the efficacy of regulation? Is this allocation of workers socially inefficient? And why do regulatory agencies make comparatively little use of performance pay?

This paper gives a very parsimonious but perhaps surprising answer to these questions. We show that if workers derive a utility benefit from working in regulation—due, for example, to *public-sector motivation* or to human capital benefits—then the labor-market outcomes described above emerge naturally: in equilibrium, financial-sector regulators are less skilled, are paid less, and receive less performance-sensitive pay. Put succinctly, the job that people intrinsically enjoy *more* ends up with *worse* workers.

An extensive empirical literature supports the existence of public-sector motivation (see Perry and Hondeghem (2008) for a survey), which has also been employed in a recent literature in economics (see, e.g., Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999), Francois (2007), and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008, 2010)). In the specific context of financial-sector regulation, a former attorney in the SEC investment management division acknowledges the role of public-sector motivation in attracting workers to the SEC as follows:<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Motley Fool’s interview of Assistant Treasury Secretary Michael Barr titled “Treasury on Regulatory Failure and ‘Too Big to Fail’ ” where the interviewer, Ilan Moscovitz, mentions related observations. Available at <http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/08/23/treasury-on-regulatory-failure-and-too-big-to-fail.aspx>.

<sup>2</sup>See “Budget battles could crimp SEC’s plans” by Mark Schoeff, published on August 29, 2010, in Investment News.

*“ ‘These are all people who could be making a lot more money doing something else,’ Ms. Corsell said. Working at the SEC ‘is an opportunity to make policy and participate in the way in which the financial system works and, at this point in time, is rebuilt. That’s a pretty powerful draw to a lot of people.’ ”*

Although public-sector motivation may resemble altruism (see, e.g., Becker (1974)), the intrinsic benefit workers extract by being regulators may also stem entirely from a desire for power or any other non-pecuniary benefit; for our purposes, the distinction is unimportant. Moreover, an alternative example of intrinsic benefit stemming from working in regulation is human capital accumulation, which we analyze in Section 5. In particular, we show that low-skilled workers may start in regulation because it offers the opportunity to build human capital; and that those workers who successfully acquire human capital move to banking later in their careers. This corresponds to the notion that working at the SEC, for example, enhances an individual’s future career prospects.

Naturally, other explanations for the labor-market patterns described in the opening paragraph are possible. In particular, one might be tempted to ascribe these patterns to one of the following informal arguments: (A) political constraints determine pay in the public sector; or (B) the private sector is significantly wealthier than the public sector.<sup>3</sup> Our model speaks to both of these alternatives. With respect to (A), we show that the labor-market patterns described are constrained Pareto efficient, implying that any political constraints on compensation may be non-binding. With respect to (B), our model shows this is not a necessary condition by delivering the same predictions even when regulatory budgets are large relative to private-sector profitability.

We use our model of the financial-sector labor market to analyze how equilibrium misbehavior responds to financial-sector booms and to reductions in regulatory resources. In both cases, and as one would expect, the regulatory sector struggles to hire workers, and loses workers to the private sector, consistent with the following excerpt from a recent Financial Times article:<sup>4</sup>

*“Staff resignations doubled at the Financial Services Authority in the second quarter*

---

<sup>3</sup>Note that this second argument does not fully explain why the private sector is disproportionately attractive to high-skill workers, nor why it makes more use of performance pay.

<sup>4</sup>See “FSA exodus adds to concern over regulation” by Brooke Masters in the August 8, 2010 issue of the Financial Times.

*as the government announced plans to split up the embattled regulator and as revived private sector recruitment lured away managers and frontline supervisors.”*

Perhaps less obvious, we show that it is the highest-ability workers that the regulatory sector loses, consistent with Harry Markopolos’s memorable description of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as “a group of 3,500 chickens tasked to chase down and catch foxes which are faster, stronger and smarter than they are.”<sup>5</sup> Both effects make regulation less effective: there are fewer regulators, supervising more bankers, and the average regulator is now less skilled. Consequently, equilibrium misbehavior by bankers increases in financial-sector booms. Moreover, when the financial sector booms, larger bonuses are paid there.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related literature. Section 2 introduces the general environment and Section 3 develops the model’s main implications in a risk-neutral setting. In Section 4, we extend our analysis to the case where workers are risk averse and derive predictions about the use of performance-pay in both sectors. We develop a dynamic version of our model and interpret the intrinsic benefit of working in regulation as an improvement in human capital in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our analysis and Section 7 concludes and highlights policy implications that result from our analysis.

## 1 Literature Review

Our paper is related to Povel, Singh and Winton (2007) who also describe a relationship between equilibrium misbehavior and business conditions. Their model focuses on firms soliciting capital from investors who can monitor the information that firm managers disclose. The overall profitability of the sector affects investors’ beliefs about the quantity of (bad) firms that might want to produce fraudulent information in hopes of being financed. The endogenous monitoring of firms by investors then affects whether or not firm managers commit fraud. We instead focus on the labor market for financial workers. In our model, business conditions in the banking sector dictate

---

<sup>5</sup>Harry Markopolos is best known for his (ignored) warnings to the SEC concerning Bernard Madoff. His description of the SEC is from a testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, available in full at <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509/exhibit-0269.pdf>.

the compensation that banks offer to potential employees. The better compensation banks offer, the harder it is for regulatory agencies to prevent skilled workers from leaving for the banking sector. As the number and average skill of regulators decrease, the quality of the monitoring also decreases, making the expected cost of misbehaving lower and misbehavior more prevalent in the banking sector.

A small literature studies workers' choices between the financial sector and a "real" sector, and emphasizes the possibility that too many workers end up in the financial sector (see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), or, for more recent examples, Philippon (2010) and Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011)). Instead, we study the choice between working in finance and in regulation. Moreover, the equilibrium allocation of workers in our model—namely, higher skilled workers in finance and lower skilled workers in regulation—is (constrained) Pareto efficient.

Although our model focuses on the regulation of the financial sector, our paper also contributes to the broader literature about the effect of non-pecuniary incentives on employment. Brennan (1994) highlights that rational agents may derive utility from being virtuous or altruistic. Carlin and Gervais (2009) focus on work ethic and model a firm's hiring decisions when facing a pool of workers with heterogeneous levels of work ethic—some workers are self-interested as in most agency models, while some workers exert effort without the need for extra incentives. Both the type (i.e., egoistic vs. virtuous) and skill (i.e., high vs. low) of workers is unobservable; the authors solve for optimal contracts and show that perfect screening of virtuous agents is never achieved. Carlin and Gervais (2009) assume an exogenously given reservation utility for each worker who considers working for the firm. Our paper instead focuses on the effect of a *job-specific* intrinsic motivation on labor matching, when a worker's reservation utility is endogenously determined based on the allocation of workers among jobs. In this sense, our paper contributes to the labor matching literature on public-sector careers in general. Papers that focus on issues related to working in the public sector include Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) who study career concerns in organizations with multiple missions and/or a lack of focus, Besley and Ghatak (2005) who analyze the advantages of matching differentially motivated workers to appropriate organizations, Francois (2007) who studies how a free-rider problem in an organization that produces a good valuable to

several, but not all, of its employees could lead some employees to “donate” their time to ensure that the good is produced, and Prendergast (2003, 2007) who studies the inefficiencies of bureaucratic organizations and how exploiting workers’ biases can reduce these inefficiencies. Unlike our paper, these papers do not study employment in the public and private sectors simultaneously.

To the best of our knowledge, only two other papers propose labor market models with workers of different ability levels choosing between working in the private sector and in the public sector.<sup>6</sup> Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) study a model with three types of worker: a benchmark type, a dedicated type that has a lower cost of effort in the public sector, and a lazy type that has a higher cost. As in the current paper, a worker’s type is private information. Dedicated workers display a form of public-sector motivation. As in our model, and others, this implies that they can be paid less. When the public sector needs only a few workers, it hires only dedicated workers. It also demands little work from each of them, since it is cheaper to increase output by hiring more workers than by extracting more effort from existing workers. If instead the public sector needs many workers, it hires a mix of dedicated and lazy workers, since the contract offered to lazy workers is not very tempting for dedicated workers, and so is less distorting. The second case, in which the public sector hires lazy workers, is similar to our result that the public sector hires the worst workers. However, the model is such that it cannot say anything on why the best workers in the economy end up in the private sector, which is a key prediction of our model. Moreover, the model is silent on incentive pay and human capital formation.<sup>7</sup>

In a second paper, Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) again study an economy with multiple worker types, which this time are public information. They observe that public-sector motivation essentially lowers the marginal cost of the inputs for the public sector. It then follows that at the social optimum the marginal product in the public sector should be lower. In their model, this in turn implies that the return to skill is lower in the public sector, and hence the most talented workers

---

<sup>6</sup>Although Jaimovich and Rud (2011) study an economy with heterogeneously-skilled agents, they assume that only high-skill agents are able to choose among occupations—bureaucracy and entrepreneurship—and so cannot say anything about the skill composition of these sectors. Instead, they focus on the existence of multiple equilibria, and in particular on the possibility that an inefficient public sector is self-reinforcing because inefficiency makes the return from entrepreneurship low, and hence entrepreneurship unattractive. See also Macchiavello (2008) for a related observation.

<sup>7</sup>The authors briefly consider a case in which effort is unverifiable. Since output is deterministic, the contracts in this case are simple forcing contracts, which pay a worker only if output reaches some critical level.

should work in the private sector. Our paper complements Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) by describing a different mechanism that pushes the most talented workers into the private sector. In contrast to their paper, our mechanism does not rely on the marginal product being higher in the private sector. So in particular, even if regulatory agencies are underfunded, and the marginal product of regulatory resources is consequently high, our results still apply, and regulatory agencies are still best off using their limited resources to employ lower-skilled workers. In addition, this second paper is again silent on incentive pay and human capital formation. In contrast, our model with risk-averse workers makes predictions that are consistent with findings by Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) that incentive pay systems are far more widespread in the private sector than in the public sector.

## 2 Model

A continuum of workers can be employed as bankers or as regulators. There are two types of workers: low-skill and high-skill. There is a mass 1 of low-skill workers and a mass  $\eta$  of high-skill workers. What differentiates these two types of workers is the probability of succeeding in their work-related tasks. To avoid hard-wiring any particular allocation of workers into our model, we assume that the probability of success for each worker type is the same in both jobs:  $q_L$  for the low-skill worker and  $q_H$  for the high-skill worker, where  $q_L < q_H$ . Equivalently, we could allow these success probabilities to change with the sector as long as the ratio of productivity for the high type over the low type is constant across sectors.

A banker's job is to oversee investments in projects. Each banker deals with one project, and there are at least  $1 + \eta$  projects in the economy (so there are sufficient projects even if all workers become bankers). A project's outcome depends on how effectively the banker monitors it. For simplicity, we assume that when a project is successful, it generates a net profit to the bank of  $p$  ( $> 0$ ) and when it fails the net profit is 0. (It would be straightforward to generalize our model to one in which the payoff  $p$  from a successful project is replaced by  $P(n)$ , a decreasing function of the number of projects financed.) A banker's skill affects his monitoring ability, which in turn affects the probability that the project is successful: projects monitored by high-skill bankers succeed with

probability  $q_H$ , while projects monitored by low-skill bankers succeed with probability  $q_L$ .

A worker's skill is only known by the worker himself. Hence, when hired, bankers are offered a menu of performance-contingent compensation contracts. Each menu item is denoted  $w_B = (w_{BS}, w_{BF})$ , where  $w_{BS}$  is the payment when the project is successful and  $w_{BF}$  is the payment if the project is a failure. By standard arguments, we can assume the menu contains just two contracts, one intended for high-skill workers,  $w_B^H$ , and one intended for low-skill workers,  $w_B^L$ .

Bankers can also misbehave. This opportunity represents anything that regulators are responsible for monitoring and preventing, such as defrauding small entrepreneurs, a government agency, or the general public. To keep things simple, we model misbehavior as being unrelated to the standard banking activities in the economy.

When a banker misbehaves, we assume that he collects a payoff  $z$ , which differs across individuals following a continuous cumulative distribution function. Each individual learns about his opportunities for misbehavior only after deciding whether to become a banker.<sup>8</sup> It simplifies considerably the algebra in the risk-averse setting to assume, moreover, that an individual learns  $z$  only after finding out whether his investment project is successful.

When effectively monitored by a regulator, misbehavior results in a (possibly non-monetary) fine  $K$ , which may depend on  $z$  (if, e.g., the fine entails repayment of fraudulent gains). Let  $r$  denote the probability of being effectively investigated, which is determined in equilibrium based on the ratio of bankers to regulators, and the average skill of regulators.

It is worth noting that the details of how we model bankers' misbehavior have little impact on our main results about worker allocation. What really matters is how much the opportunity to misbehave is worth to workers, compared to the intrinsic benefit of working in regulation, when they decide on a career.

Our key assumption is that workers who become regulators receive an intrinsic benefit  $\Delta$ , due for example to the social recognition from acting as public servants, or as we illustrate in Section 5, stemming from the acquisition of human capital useful in later stages of their careers. We assume for now that such intrinsic benefit is outcome independent, or in other words, that it does not

---

<sup>8</sup>Consequently, we only need to consider two worker-types, low-skill and high-skill, in the analysis of the labor market.

depend on a worker's skill level. We show in Section 6 that this assumption can be partially relaxed without changing our results. Regulators investigate bankers to check if they misbehaved. With probability  $q_i$  a regulator of skill level  $i \in \{L, H\}$  determines the truth, i.e., whether or not a banker misbehaved. We describe this outcome as a *useful report*, since the information generated can be used to penalize a banker. With probability  $1 - q_i$  the regulator learns nothing.

Exactly as for bankers, when hired regulators are offered a menu of two performance-contingent compensation contracts  $\{w_R^H, w_R^L\}$ : for  $i \in \{H, L\}$ ,  $w_R^i = (w_{RS}^i, w_{RF}^i)$ , where  $w_{RS}^i$  is the payment for a useful report and  $w_{RF}^i$  is the payment otherwise. All regulatory agencies aim to learn as much as they can about the actions of bankers, so they maximize the number of useful reports they can generate using an equal share of the total regulatory budget  $M$ . This total regulatory budget is exogenously given and regulatory agencies cannot change this amount. As we discuss below, it would be a straightforward exercise to consider the regulatory budget  $M$  that a social planner would optimally choose. However, our main results do not depend on the level of  $M$ , which has the advantage of making them positive rather than normative. To simplify the interpretation of our results, we make only the very mild assumption that the total regulatory budget  $M$  is such that regulatory agencies cannot employ *all* workers. Formally:<sup>9</sup>

**Assumption 1**  $M < (\eta q_H + q_L) \left( p - \frac{\Delta}{q_H} \right)$ .

A worker's utility from being a regulator is  $u(w + \Delta)$ . A worker's utility from being a banker is  $u(w + z - K(z))$  if he misbehaves and is caught;  $u(w + z)$  if he misbehaves and is not caught; and  $u(w)$  if he abstains from misbehaving.

Define  $U^i(w_B^j)$  as the expected utility for a worker of type  $i$  from accepting the banking contract intended for type  $j$ . Likewise, define  $U^i(w_R^j)$  as the utility for a worker of type  $i$  from accepting the regulator contract intended for type  $j$ . Since we assume the misbehavior decision

---

<sup>9</sup>See the proof of Proposition 2 for details on how Assumption 1 guarantees that not all workers can be employed as regulators.

takes place after the banker observes whether he has succeeded or failed,

$$\begin{aligned}
U^i(w_B^j) &= q_i E_z \left[ \max \left\{ (1-r) u(w_{BS}^j + z) + r u(w_{BS}^j + z - K(z)), u(w_{BS}^j) \right\} \right] \\
&\quad + (1-q_i) E_z \left[ \max \left\{ (1-r) u(w_{BF}^j + z) + r u(w_{BF}^j + z - K(z)), u(w_{BF}^j) \right\} \right] \\
U^i(w_R^j) &= q_i u(w_{RS}^j + \Delta) + (1-q_i) u(w_{RF}^j + \Delta).
\end{aligned}$$

We assume that there are at least two regulatory agencies and two banks, and focus on symmetric equilibria in which all regulatory agencies offer the same contracts, and likewise, all banks do also. Having two employers in each sector ensures that if an employer deviates and offers a contract other than the equilibrium contract, the equilibrium contract is still available. When multiple employers offer the same contract, we assume that workers randomize among them with equal probability. We also assume free-entry into the banking sector, so in equilibrium all banks must make zero profits (see also the robustness discussion in Section 6).

Labor market outcomes are summarized by the fraction of workers of each skill level who enter each of the two sectors. For  $i \in \{H, L\}$ , let  $\alpha^i$  denote the fraction of workers with skill level  $i$  who become bankers; hence a fraction  $1 - \alpha^i$  become regulators.

To close the model, we need to relate labor-market outcomes to the efficacy of regulators, that is, to the equilibrium probability  $r$  of misbehavior detection. Assume that each regulator can monitor a measure  $\lambda > 0$  of bankers and that monitoring occurs successively, so that two useful reports are never produced on the same banker (unless the number of regulators is so large that a useful report is produced on *every* banker). So the regulatory sector collects useful information about  $\min \{ \lambda [(1 - \alpha^L) q_L + \eta (1 - \alpha^H) q_H], \alpha^L + \eta \alpha^H \}$  of the  $\alpha^L + \eta \alpha^H$  bankers. Hence the probability that a given misbehaving banker will be penalized is

$$G((1 - \alpha^L) q_L + \eta (1 - \alpha^H) q_H, \alpha^L + \eta \alpha^H) \equiv \min \left\{ 1, \lambda \frac{(1 - \alpha^L) q_L + \eta (1 - \alpha^H) q_H}{\alpha^L + \eta \alpha^H} \right\}.$$

It is worth stressing that our results hold for many other parameterizations of the misbehavior-detection function  $G$ ; all we require is that  $G$  is continuous in its two arguments, weakly increasing in the total number of useful reports, and weakly decreasing in the total number of bankers.

Define  $\Pi^i(w_B)$  as a bank's per-worker profits from employing a type- $i$  worker using contract  $w_B$ . Define  $\rho^i(w_R) = \frac{q_i}{q_i w_{RS} + (1-q_i) w_{RF}}$  as a regulatory agency's productivity (i.e., the ratio of the number of useful reports to expected compensation paid) from employing a type- $i$  worker using contract  $w_R$ . For a regulatory agency that employs both types of worker, specifically,  $k^i > 0$  workers of type  $i$  using contract  $w_R^i$ , define  $\mu^i = k^i (q_i w_{RS}^i + (1-q_i) w_{RF}^i) / \sum_{j=L,H} k^j (q_j w_{RS}^j + (1-q_j) w_{RF}^j)$  as the fraction of the compensation paid to workers of type  $i$ ; the regulatory agency's overall productivity is then  $\sum_{i=L,H} \mu^i \rho^i(w_R^i)$ .

An equilibrium of our economy is defined as follows:

**Definition 1** *An equilibrium is vector  $(w_B^H, w_B^L, w_R^H, w_R^L, \alpha^H, \alpha^L, r)$  satisfying:*

- *Labor market: utility maximization by workers among contracts*

– *If  $\alpha^i > 0$  (i.e., some workers of type  $i$  become bankers), then:*

$$U^i(w_B^i) \geq \max \left\{ U^i(w_B^j), U^i(w_R^i), U^i(w_R^j) \right\}$$

– *If  $\alpha^i < 1$  (i.e., some workers of type  $i$  become regulators), then:*

$$U^i(w_R^i) \geq \max \left\{ U^i(w_R^j), U^i(w_B^i), U^i(w_B^j) \right\}$$

- *For banks: There is no deviation  $\{\tilde{w}_B^H, \tilde{w}_B^L\}$  such that, taking all other contracts as fixed, a fraction  $\tilde{\alpha}^i$  of type- $i$  workers accepts contract  $\tilde{w}_B^i$ , and the bank strictly increases its profits.*
- *For regulatory agencies: There is no deviation  $\{\tilde{w}_R^H, \tilde{w}_R^L\}$  such that, taking all other contracts as fixed, a fraction  $1 - \tilde{\alpha}^i$  of type- $i$  workers accepts contract  $\tilde{w}_R^i$ , and the regulatory agency strictly increases its productivity.*
- *Total regulatory expenditure equals the budget,  $M = (1 - \alpha^L) (q_L w_{RS}^L + (1 - q_L) w_{RF}^L) + (1 - \alpha^H) \eta (q_H w_{RS}^H + (1 - q_H) w_{RF}^H)$ ; and the probability  $r$  that misbehavior is detected is consistent with the labor market outcome,  $r = G((1 - \alpha^L) q_L + \eta (1 - \alpha^H) q_H; \alpha^L + \eta \alpha^H)$*

The following result, which is standard from models of competition and adverse selection, helps simplify the analysis. Unless otherwise stated, proofs are relegated to the Appendix.

**Lemma 1** *In equilibrium, banks extract zero profits from each type of worker employed and regulatory agencies extract the same productivity from each type of worker employed. Consequently, the expected compensation of a banker of type  $i$  is  $q_i p$ ; and there exists  $s$  such that the expected compensation of a regulator of type  $i$  is  $q_i s$ .*

### 3 Risk-Neutral Workers

In this section, we assume all workers are risk neutral. Consequently, a banker misbehaves whenever the payoff from doing so,  $z$ , exceeds the expected penalty,  $rK(z)$ , where recall that  $r$  is the equilibrium probability of being caught when misbehaving. The aggregate incidence of misbehavior in the economy is then  $(\alpha^L + \eta\alpha^H) Pr(z > rK(z))$ , since  $\alpha^L + \eta\alpha^H$  represents the total number of bankers in equilibrium. To ease notation, we define  $\phi(r) \equiv E_z [\max(z - rK(z), 0)]$ , representing a banker's expected payoff from the opportunity to misbehave.

How are workers allocated between the two sectors? A worker of type  $i$  is paid his marginal product in banking (see Lemma 1). Given risk neutrality and the possibility of fraudulent gains, his total expected utility from becoming a banker is  $q_i p + \phi(r)$ . Consequently, a regulatory agency must offer a worker of type  $i$  an expected compensation of at least  $q_i p - (\Delta - \phi(r))$  in order to attract that worker.

Our main observation is that, whenever the benefit of regulation,  $\Delta$ , is larger than the net gain from misbehavior,  $\phi(r)$ , regulators will hire high-skill workers only after they have completely exhausted the supply of low-skill workers and some regulatory budget remains. More formally, low-skill bankers and high-skill regulators cannot coexist.

To see this, suppose to the contrary that low-skill bankers and high-skill regulators coexist in equilibrium. Note that (by above) a high-skill regulator must receive expected compensation of at least  $q_H p - (\Delta - \phi(r))$ , and so the regulatory agency's productivity from this worker is at most  $\frac{q_H}{q_H p - (\Delta - \phi(r))}$ . Instead, a regulatory agency could poach low-skill bankers by offering a contract

paying just above  $\frac{q_L p - (\Delta - \phi(r))}{q_L}$  in the case of success, and nothing after failure. Low-skill bankers will accept this contract, and the regulatory agency's productivity from these poached workers is  $\frac{q_L}{q_L p - (\Delta - \phi(r))}$ .<sup>10</sup> Whenever  $\Delta > \phi(r)$ , this productivity level exceeds the upper-bound on the productivity of existing high-skill regulators, implying that regulatory agencies would benefit from poaching low-skill bankers (and firing some of their existing high-skill workers). This contradicts the equilibrium assumption and establishes:

**Proposition 1** *In any equilibrium with  $\Delta > \phi(r)$ , bankers are more skilled than regulators. Formally, there is no equilibrium in which some high-skill workers are regulators ( $\alpha^H < 1$ ) and some low-skill workers are bankers ( $\alpha^L > 0$ ).*

A simple numerical example may help to illustrate Proposition 1. Suppose high-skill workers are twice as productive per unit of effort as low-skill workers, with  $q_H = 2/3$  and  $q_L = 1/3$ ; the payoff from a successful project is  $p = 300$ ; and the net utility gain from regulatory work,  $\Delta - \phi(r)$ , is 50. In this case, expected compensation for the two types in banking is 200 and 100 respectively. In particular, the high-skill worker receives twice as much, reflecting his higher productivity. In contrast, a regulatory agency needs to pay expected compensation of at least 150 and 50 to attract each of the two types. Since high-skill workers must be paid three times as much as low-skill workers, but are only twice as productive, high-skill workers become regulators in equilibrium only if regulatory agencies exhaust the entire supply of low-skilled workers and some budget remains. In equilibrium, the most intrinsically attractive job—here, regulation—ends up with the worst workers.

Proposition 1 arises because all workers obtain the same intrinsic benefit from working in regulation. This implies that instead of hiring one high-skill worker, it is cheaper for a regulatory agency to hire a mass  $\frac{q_H}{q_L}$  of low-skill workers. The reason is that the cost savings due to the positive net intrinsic benefit from working in regulation are greater when hiring  $\frac{q_H}{q_L}$  low-skill workers than one high-skill worker.

Related, the intuition for Proposition 1 can be expressed as follows. Each worker who enters

---

<sup>10</sup>Because workers are only rewarded for success, a regulatory agency's productivity from any high-skill workers who accept this new contract is exactly the same as for low-skill workers.

banking pays a fixed utility cost of  $\Delta - \phi(r)$  relative to entering regulation. Net of this fixed utility cost, the ratio of the productivity of low- and high-skill workers in banking is  $\frac{q_L - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{p}}{q_H - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{p}}$ , compared to simply  $\frac{q_L}{q_H}$  in regulation. The latter expression is the larger one when  $\Delta > \phi(r)$ , and so low-skill workers have a *comparative* advantage in regulation. This comparative advantage is a consequence of the intrinsic benefit; if instead  $\Delta = \phi(r) = 0$ , low-skill workers do not have a comparative advantage, since the ratio of productivities equals  $\frac{q_L}{q_H}$  in both sectors.

It is worth highlighting that although intrinsic benefits  $\Delta > \phi(r)$  lead to an equilibrium allocation of less-skilled workers to regulation, it does *not* follow that regulatory agencies would wish to reduce the attractiveness of regulatory jobs by reducing  $\Delta$ . Doing so simply increases the compensation they have to offer workers, and reduces their productivity, as measured by the number of successful investigations per dollar of expected compensation.

If some regulatory budget remains unused after the supply of low-skill workers is exhausted, regulatory agencies then hire high-skill workers. In this case, the compensation of high-skill regulators is determined by competition with the banking sector, so that high-skill workers are indifferent between the two jobs. In contrast, regulatory agencies bid up the compensation of low-skill workers until they have the same productivity per dollar of expected compensation as high-skill workers, but low-skill workers strictly prefer working in regulation to banking.

Here, we take the total regulatory budget  $M$  as exogenously given. It would, however, be straightforward to solve for the optimal  $M$  in a setting where the central planner, say the federal government, attempts to maximize the total value created by bankers, net of penalty functions for the incidence of misbehavior and the use of public funds.

In equilibrium, the allocation of skilled workers is tilted towards the banking sector and, contrary to the popular view, a high-value banking sector and a resource-scarce regulatory sector are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for this outcome. It is not necessary because in our model, bankers are more skilled than regulators even when regulatory budgets are large compared to profits in the banking sector, i.e., the public sector is wealthier than the private sector. It is not sufficient because if instead the expected gain from misbehavior is larger than the intrinsic benefit  $\Delta$ , then in equilibrium the most skilled workers become regulators; this follows from a

straightforward adaption of the proof of Proposition 1. (Consequently, a small perturbation in parameter values such that the sign of  $\Delta - \phi(r)$  is reversed would generate drastic changes in the allocation of workers.)

For the remainder of the section we make the following assumption, which we believe is the empirically relevant case:

**Assumption 2** *The intrinsic benefit of regulation exceeds the expected gain from misbehavior even with zero probability of punishment,  $\Delta > \phi(0)$ .*

Assumption 2 ensures that  $\Delta > \phi(r)$  and so any equilibrium is of the form of Proposition 1. The reader should note that this assumption is stronger than we really need, since for most parameter configurations the equilibrium detection probability  $r$  is strictly positive in any equilibrium and the average gain from misbehavior is smaller than  $\phi(0)$ .

Next, we prove the existence of an equilibrium along the lines described prior to Proposition 1.

**Proposition 2** *At least one equilibrium exists.*

The proof of equilibrium existence consists of conjecturing a number of bankers  $n$ , and then using Proposition 1 to construct a candidate equilibrium satisfying all equilibrium conditions except for budget-balancing for regulatory agencies. This gives a mapping,  $W$ , from a candidate number of bankers to a compensation bill for regulatory agencies. Any number of bankers  $n$  such that  $W(n)$  matches the regulatory budget  $M$  constitutes an equilibrium. Clearly  $W(1 + \eta) = 0$ , since in this case all workers are bankers and so the regulator compensation bill is 0. At the opposite extreme, Assumption 1 guarantees that regulatory agencies do not have the resources to hire all workers, i.e.,  $W(n) > M$  as  $n \rightarrow 0$ . By the intermediate-value theorem, there exists at least one level of  $n$  such that the regulatory compensation bill  $W(n)$  matches the budget  $M$ , and hence an equilibrium exists.<sup>11</sup>

Given this proof of equilibrium existence, comparative statics follow easily. An improvement in the payoffs of banking projects leads to an increase in banker compensation for any conjectured

---

<sup>11</sup>In a little more detail,  $W$  is a correspondence, but is single-valued everywhere except for  $n = \eta$  (i.e., all high-skilled workers are bankers and all low-skilled workers are regulators). We use a straightforward extension of the intermediate-value theorem: see John (1999).

number of bankers, and hence to an increase in regulator compensation also. So the function  $W$  increases everywhere, giving the following corollary:

**Corollary 1** *As either the banking payoff  $p$  increases, or the total regulatory budget  $M$  decreases:*

- (a) the banking sector grows and the regulatory sector shrinks,*
- (b) the average skill of either bankers or regulators falls while the average skill in the other sector remains unchanged,*
- (c) the probability that misbehavior is detected falls,*
- (d) the incidence of misbehavior increases.*

*If there is complete segregation of types (i.e., the number of bankers exactly equals  $\eta$ ) both before and after the change, all statements hold only weakly. In addition, (c) holds only weakly if the detection probability is 1. If there are multiple equilibria,<sup>12</sup> these statements are all true for the equilibria with the smallest and largest banking sectors.*

When banking becomes more profitable or the regulatory budget decreases, fewer workers can be employed in regulation. Since the workers transferring from regulation to banking are either less skilled than the average initial bankers and/or more skilled than the average remaining regulators, the average skill of workers in both jobs weakly falls.

The equilibrium probability of misbehavior being detected then falls for two reasons. First, the number of bankers increases while the number of regulators decreases. Second, the workers moving from the regulatory sector to the banking sector are weakly more skilled than the remaining regulators, hence the average skill of regulators decreases. And unless the remaining regulators are still numerous enough to successfully monitor all bankers, misbehavior is then detected less

---

<sup>12</sup>Multiple equilibria may arise as follows. The labor market equilibrium is determined by the regulatory agencies' budget constraint. Fix an equilibrium, and consider an exogenous increase in the number of regulators. This has two countervailing effects on a regulatory agency's expenditure. First, the regulatory agency must spend more to employ the extra workers. The second effect, however, operates in the opposite direction: the increase in the number of regulators decreases a banker's potential gains from misbehaving. This effect acts to *reduce* the equilibrium compensation that must be offered to regulators. If this second effect is strong enough to be the dominant one, an exogenous increase in the number of regulators may actually decrease a regulatory agency's total expenditure. In this case, one can show that there exists an interval of regulatory budgets  $M$  such that multiple equilibria exist. Conversely, one can show that the equilibrium is unique whenever the regulatory budget  $M$  is sufficiently low; or if the misbehavior detection function  $G$  is sufficient unresponsive to changes in the pools of bankers and regulators. Finally, it is worth noting that a standard consequence of equilibrium multiplicity is that the equilibrium correspondence is discontinuous in the regulatory budget  $M$  and the banking payoff function, implying that small changes may have very large effects on equilibrium outcomes.

often than before, implying that the equilibrium level of misbehavior increases with the overall profitability of banking tasks. Financial-sector booms are then associated with periods of increased misbehavior.

We conclude this section with a discussion of the efficiency of equilibrium outcomes. We start by observing that, under risk neutrality, asymmetric information has no effect on equilibrium outcomes. Indeed, note that asymmetric information played no role in the proof of Proposition 1. In contrast, asymmetric information will have an effect when we consider risk-averse workers in the next section. The reason asymmetric information has no equilibrium impact under risk neutrality is that it is always possible for an employer to offer a contract that only type  $i \in \{L, H\}$  accepts, without imposing any inefficiency. Formally:

**Lemma 2** *( $w_B^H, w_B^L, w_R^H, w_R^L, \alpha^H, \alpha^L, r$ ) is an equilibrium if and only if there is an equilibrium of the full-information economy with the same allocation of workers and the same utility levels.*

We next establish a form of the first welfare theorem, i.e., that any decentralized equilibrium of our economy is Pareto efficient. Recall that, in establishing our results, we have imposed no restrictions on the total budget  $M$  of regulatory agencies (beyond the mild Assumption 1). Consequently, our equilibrium characterization holds regardless of whether society spends too much, or too little, on regulation. Accordingly, the appropriate notion of Pareto efficiency is *constrained* Pareto efficiency, where the planner is constrained to allocations in which payments to regulators sum to exactly  $M$ . Otherwise, the planner is able to freely allocate workers to be either bankers or regulators, after observing worker types, and to stipulate any transfers to and from both workers and consumers (who are the victims of banker misbehavior).<sup>13</sup> The planner cannot directly stipulate a level of banker misbehavior: instead, this is determined exactly as described above, and in particular, by the detection probability function  $G$ .

Finally, we make the following assumption about the social value of banking:

**Assumption 3** *(A) Banks appropriate all surplus of successful investments, which equals  $p$ . (B) The cost of misbehavior in banking exceeds the banker's gain, i.e., the net cost is positive.*

---

<sup>13</sup>We do not allow the social planner to stipulate *ex ante* lotteries in which a worker has some probability of being a banker and some probability of being a regulator.

Part (A) ensures that the size of banking sector is not hardwired to be too large, or too small and that any inefficiency we may uncover in the decentralized equilibrium results from the allocation of workers, the focus of this paper, rather than from the more obvious channel of distorted investment policies by banks. Part (B)'s assumption that banker misbehavior is, on net, socially costly is natural: if this were not the case, it is hard to see why society would be interested in regulation in the first place.

**Proposition 3** *Any decentralized equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient.*

If given the same resources  $M$ , a social planner who observes workers' types and wants to maximize the total surplus in the economy finds it optimal to allocate workers just like in our decentralized equilibrium. Allocating less skilled workers to regulatory tasks and more skilled workers to banking tasks is a socially efficient response to the existence of intrinsic benefits in the regulatory sector.

Note that Proposition 3 is not an immediate consequence of the first welfare theorem because regulatory agencies have a fixed budget, and related, do not maximize profits. Indeed, it holds even though the decentralized equilibrium entails banks imposing a negative externality on the ultimate victims of banker misbehavior, who do not participate in setting labor-market contracts.

In brief, the argument behind Proposition 3 is the following. Consider a decentralized equilibrium. Because, by Proposition 1, regulatory agencies employ the cheapest—i.e., low-skill—workers, a social planner's only option—given the fixed budget  $M$ —is to decrease the size of the regulatory sector and increase the size of the banking sector. But we know that, in equilibrium, banks cannot profitably expand, even when they do not internalize the social cost of banker misbehavior. Internalizing the cost of misbehavior only reinforces this observation, and implies that no increase in total social welfare is possible.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>To highlight the fact that Proposition 3 is not an immediate consequence of the first welfare theorem, it is worth noting that it would *not* necessarily hold under the alternate parameter assumption that  $\Delta < \phi(r)$ . As discussed, under this alternate assumption any decentralized equilibrium features low-skill workers as bankers and high-skill workers as regulators. Because regulatory agencies now employ the most expensive workers, a social planner could shrink the banking sector by replacing many low-skill bankers with a few of the high-skilled workers currently in regulation. This switch is potentially socially beneficial because it reduces the number of bankers, and hence may reduce the amount of banker misbehavior.

## 4 Risk-Averse Workers

In this section, we analyze performance pay by relaxing the assumption that workers are risk neutral. In particular, when workers are instead risk averse, our model implies that regulators receive less performance pay than bankers, consistent with widely held perception. Moreover, we show that when banking payoffs increase bonuses paid in the financial sector increase as well. In other words, financial-sector booms do not simply increase base pay; they also affect performance pay.

A banker who receives compensation  $w$  and has an opportunity to gain  $z$  will misbehave if and only if:

$$(1 - r)u(w + z) + ru(w + z - K(z)) > u(w).$$

To eliminate wealth effects in a banker's decision of whether to misbehave or not, which are tangential to our main analysis, we assume that workers have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), i.e.,  $u(c) \equiv -e^{-\gamma c}$ , where  $\gamma$  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The decision rule reduces to

$$(1 - r + re^{\gamma K(z)})e^{-\gamma z}u(w) > u(w).$$

Since  $u$  is negative, this inequality says that the banker misbehaves if and only if  $z$ , the gain from doing so, exceeds some critical level. Moreover, by defining

$$\Phi(r) \equiv E_z \left[ \min \left\{ 1, e^{-\gamma z} (1 - r + re^{\gamma K(z)}) \right\} \right].$$

we can write a worker's utility from banking,  $U^i(w_B^j)$ , as<sup>15</sup>

$$U^i(w_B^j) = (q_i u(w_{BS}^j) + (1 - q_i) u(w_{BF}^j)) \Phi(r).$$

---

<sup>15</sup>Note that the ability to write  $U^i(w_B^j)$  in this way is a consequence of our assumption that the misbehavior decision is taken after a banker observes whether he has succeeded or failed. While this assumption facilitates our analysis and exposition in the risk-averse setting, it is not required for any of our derivations in the risk-neutral setting.

Likewise, a worker's utility from regulation,  $U^i(w_R^j)$ , is

$$U^i(w_R^j) = \left( q_i u(w_{RS}^j) + (1 - q_i) u(w_{RF}^j) \right) e^{-\gamma \Delta}.$$

Because of the CARA utility assumption, the utility the worker extracts from his job can be written as the expected utility from consuming the chosen compensation contract times a multiplier that either adjusts for the extra benefits from misbehaving as a banker or from working as a regulator.

Just as in the risk-neutral setting, whenever the intrinsic benefit of working in regulation  $\Delta$  is sufficiently large compared to the net payoff from the opportunity to misbehave, it is the least skilled workers who become regulators.

**Proposition 4** *In any equilibrium with  $\Delta > -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)$ , bankers are more skilled than regulators. Formally, there is no equilibrium in which  $\Delta > -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)$ , some high-skill workers are regulators ( $\alpha^H < 1$ ), and some low-skill workers are bankers ( $\alpha^L > 0$ ).*

Proposition 4 is identical to Proposition 1, but for the risk-averse setting. As before, it would be straightforward to adapt the proof to establish the parallel result; if instead the average gain from misbehavior is larger, then in equilibrium the most skilled workers become regulators. But for the remainder of the section, we assume:

**Assumption 4** *The intrinsic benefit of regulation exceeds the expected gain from misbehavior even with zero probability of punishment,  $-e^{-\gamma \Delta} > E_z[-e^{-\gamma z}]$ .*

Assumption 4 is equivalent to  $\Delta > -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(0)$ , and hence ensures that  $\Delta > -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)$  and so any equilibrium is of the form of Proposition 4. The reader should note, again, that Assumption 4 is stronger than what we really need, since for most parameter configurations the equilibrium detection probability  $r$  is strictly positive in any equilibrium.

We now derive a result that is new to the risk-averse setting, namely that the adverse selection problem forces banks to offer compensation that is more sensitive to performance than that offered by regulatory agencies. Because workers are strictly risk averse, by a standard argument any equilibrium must entail full-insurance for low-skill workers. Focusing on regulation contracts,

suppose to the contrary that in equilibrium a low-skill worker is not fully insured, i.e.,  $w_{RS}^L \neq w_{RF}^L$ . Then a regulatory agency could offer a new full-insurance contract,  $\tilde{w}_{RS} = \tilde{w}_{RF} = q_L w_{RS}^L + (1 - q_L) w_{RF}^L - \varepsilon$ , where  $\varepsilon > 0$ . Provided  $\varepsilon$  is chosen sufficiently small, a low-skill worker strictly prefers this new contract to the equilibrium contract. Moreover, the contract strictly improves the regulatory agency's productivity when accepted by low-skill workers; and productivity is even higher if it is accepted by high-skill workers. But this contradicts the supposition that the original contract is part of an equilibrium. A parallel proof applies to banking contracts.

Given that low-skill workers are completely insured in equilibrium, high-skill workers cannot be—that is, high-skill workers must receive some degree of performance-based pay. For the case in which both high- and low-skill workers are bankers, this is again a standard argument, and is easy to see. If high-skill workers were fully insured, they would receive exactly the same contract as low-skill workers working in the same sector, since otherwise all workers would opt for the more attractive of the two fixed-compensation contracts. But then profits would not be zero for both types of workers in banking. An identical argument applies in the case in which both high and low skill workers are employed by regulators.

The following result is then easily obtained:<sup>16</sup>

**Proposition 5** *In any equilibrium, compensation for regulation jobs is safer than for banking jobs: either all regulators receive riskless compensation while some bankers do not, or all bankers receive performance-based compensation while some regulators do not.*

Here, the safer compensation contracts for regulation jobs is a direct consequence of the allocation of skilled workers in equilibrium. When the intrinsic benefit of working in regulation exceeds the expected misbehavior gain, regulatory agencies employ workers who are not as skilled as those that banks employ. We also know that workers' risk aversion coupled with adverse selection ensures that low-skill workers receive safer compensation contracts. Consequently, compensation in regulation is, on average, safer than compensation in banking as regulators are, on average, less skilled than bankers.

---

<sup>16</sup>The only case not handled in the text immediately above is that in which all high-skill workers become bankers and all low-skill workers become regulators. This case is dealt with in the appendix.

This result is different from the mechanism suggested by Dixit (2002). In his case, the more workers derive utility from exerting effort, the less sensitive to performance compensation has to be to secure a given level of effort. In our model, workers derive utility from being regulators, not from exerting effort, per se. Yet, regulators receive compensation that is less sensitive to performance than bankers because of a job selection mechanism. On average, regulators are less skilled than bankers. This result originates from the incentive compatibility condition for high-skill workers (bankers) and the risk aversion of low-skill workers (regulators).

Another alternative explanation for the greater use of performance pay in banking is that output in regulation is less observable (or more generally, less contractible) than output in banking. However, this ranking of output-observability across the two sectors is not at all obvious to us. Nonetheless, if regulatory output really is more difficult than banking output to accurately measure, then this would only reinforce our result.

Both Propositions 4 and 5 are predicated on an equilibrium actually existing. We show that this is indeed the case, and at the same time, derive comparative statics. We relegate most of the details to the Appendix. However, one point that is worth describing in more detail is the determination of the level of compensation for regulatory workers.

The level of a banker's compensation is easy to describe—by Lemma 1, expected compensation simply equals the profit a banker is expected to generate for his employer. For the case in which the banking sector is relatively large, regulator compensation follows easily: only low-skill workers are employed by regulatory agencies, and their expected compensation is determined by the indifference condition with the contract for low-skill bankers, which is a simple contract offering guaranteed pay.

The case in which the banking sector is small—relative to the supply of high-skill workers—is a little more complicated. As before, the expected compensation of high-skill bankers is determined by the profits these workers produce. High-skill regulators must then earn an amount that makes them indifferent between working in regulation and banking. Finally, regulatory agencies bid up the compensation of low-skill regulators to the point where regulatory agencies are equally happy hiring the two different skill levels (see the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix for full details).

Our formal result is that an equilibrium exists whenever the number of high-skill workers  $\eta$  is sufficiently low (as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).<sup>17</sup>

**Proposition 6** *Provided the ratio of high-skill to low-skill workers  $\eta$  is not too large, at least one equilibrium exists.*

The comparative statics are immediate from the proof of Proposition 6:

**Corollary 2** *The comparative statics identified in Corollary 1 for the risk-neutral setting also hold in the risk-averse setting.*

The intuition behind the comparative statics for the risk-averse setting is identical to that for the risk-neutral setting. As before, an improvement in banking payoffs leads to an increase in banker compensation for any conjectured number of bankers, and hence to an increase in regulator compensation also. Moreover, because of the performance-pay implication of risk aversion, we are also able to analyze how performance pay responds to a financial boom:

**Proposition 7** *As the banking payoff  $p$  increases, the bonus compensation,  $w_{BS}^H - w_{BF}^H$ , that high-skill bankers receive when their project is successful also increases in equilibrium.*

When banking becomes more profitable and  $p$  increases, the zero-profit condition from Lemma 1 implies that bankers' expected compensation must also increase. In order to keep high-skill bankers' contracts unattractive to low-skill workers, the extra compensation high-skill bankers receive for having selected and monitored a successful project has to increase as well. Otherwise, the increase in expected compensation would all come from the base compensation  $w_{BF}^H$  and low-skill workers would then prefer to accept a contract that targets high-skill workers, violating one of the incentive-compatibility restrictions from the equilibrium definition. Consistent with the earlier

---

<sup>17</sup>The requirement that there are not too many high-skill workers is standard to the literature on competition under adverse selection: see, for example, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In brief, the issue is that any candidate equilibrium entails different contracts for high- and low-skill workers, and the contracts for high-skill workers offer less than full insurance. So if most workers have high skill, the following deviation is profitable: offer a contract that reduces the expected compensation of high-skill workers, but in return, features full insurance. All workers accept this contract, and provided that there are enough high-skill workers, the increase in profits from these workers more than offsets the losses from low-skill workers. As discussed by, for example, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), there is some dissatisfaction with this equilibrium non-existence result that arises when the high-skill type is numerous, and a number of authors have offered possible solutions; see Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) for a recent example.

discussion, the relatively harder half of establishing Proposition 7 relates to the case in which the marginal worker has high skill, and the employment contracts in the two sectors interact in a more complicated way.

## 5 Human Capital Formation in a Two-Period OLG Model

So far we have assumed that workers enjoy an exogenous gain from working in regulation. In this section, we impose more structure and analyze a two-period overlapping generation (OLG) model in which the gains  $\Delta$  from working in regulation stem from the accumulation of human capital. This interpretation of  $\Delta$  has the added benefit of making our model applicable to non-regulatory contexts, such as credit-rating agencies, where one might be sceptical about the existence of direct utility benefits. In this extension of our basic model, low-skill young workers enter regulation, while high-skill young workers immediately become bankers. Some of the workers starting in regulation acquire human capital, and then move to banking when old, consistent with the existence of a “revolving door” leading from government to the private sector.<sup>18</sup>

As in Section 3, we assume that workers are risk neutral. This greatly simplifies the algebra and allows us to focus on worker allocation issues at the cost of losing predictions about the sensitivity of pay to performance.

Switching occupations in mid-career—i.e., moving from regulation to banking, or vice versa—carries some cost. For example, the worker’s productivity may be negatively impacted; some human capital may be lost; or the worker may simply suffer some direct disutility from moving. The exact form of the cost is unimportant for our analysis, and so we assume simply that the worker bears a cost  $c \geq 0$  from switching occupations in mid-career.

There are a number of ways in which working in regulation may add to a worker’s human capital. For example, a worker might develop political connections, learn about regulators’ practices, or acquire knowledge useful for later stages of his career. To capture human capital accumulation while preserving our convenient two-type model, we assume that all workers have some probability of

---

<sup>18</sup>As will become clear below, our model cannot easily account for movements from the private sector into government.

being high-skill when old, and some probability of being low-skill when old. Working in regulation when young increases by  $\theta$  ( $> 0$ ) the probability of being high-skill when old. For now, we assume that a worker's skill levels when young and old are uncorrelated: all workers who start as bankers have a probability  $\alpha$  of being high-skill when old, while all workers who start in regulation have a probability  $\alpha + \theta$  of being high-skill when old. We return to this point in detail at the end of the section.

The gain from working in regulation when young, which we denote  $\Delta_y$ , can then be expressed as follows. Write  $V_i^R$  and  $V_i^B$  for the expected utility of an old worker with skill  $i \in \{L, H\}$  who worked *when young* in regulation and, respectively, banking. (A worker's occupation when young has a direct effect on utility when old because of the switching cost  $c$ .) Hence:

$$\Delta_y = \theta (V_H^R - V_L^R) + \alpha (V_H^R - V_H^B) + (1 - \alpha) (V_L^R - V_L^B). \quad (1)$$

That is, the effect of starting work as a regulator is a combination of the increased probability  $\theta$  of being high-skill when old (the first term of (1)), capturing human capital accumulation; and the consequences of switching costs on a worker's occupation when old (the last two terms of (1)). Note that because old workers are at the end of their careers and do not benefit from human capital accumulation, they do not benefit from working in regulation, i.e.,  $\Delta_o = 0$ .

Given our focus on human capital accumulation, our main purpose in this section is to show how an equilibrium with  $\Delta_y > 0$  and with young workers entering both sectors (consistent with reality) easily emerges. We first conjecture that a banker's expected gain from misbehavior is dominated by human capital accumulation, i.e.,  $\Delta_y > \phi(r)$ . Of course, this is an equilibrium relation; we show below how it arises.

By Lemma 1, competition among employers implies that there exists an  $s$  such that a worker of skill  $i$  earns  $q_i s$  per period when employed in regulation, and  $q_i p$  when employed in banking. The conjecture  $\Delta_y > \phi(r)$  then has two immediate but significant implications. First, young regulators are less skilled than young bankers: this is just Proposition 1. Second, conditional on some young workers being bankers, it must be the case that  $s < p$ .

Given  $s < p$ , all old workers would earn more as bankers: the gain, including the additional

benefits from misbehavior as a banker, is  $pq_i + \phi(r) - sq_i$  for a worker of skill  $i$ . However, the switching cost  $c$  means that workers who started in regulation may prefer to remain there. Conversely, no old worker would switch from banking to regulation. Note that high-skill old workers have a larger incentive to switch to banking than do low-skill workers. The economically interesting case is when some, but not all, workers switch occupations, which occurs if the switching cost  $c$  takes an intermediate level given by

$$pq_H + \phi(r) - sq_H \geq c \geq pq_L + \phi(r) - sq_L, \quad (2)$$

i.e., high-skill old workers switch from regulation to banking, but low-skill workers do not.

Given inequality (2), the gain to working in regulation when young, (1), becomes

$$\Delta_y = \theta(pq_H + \phi(r) - c - sq_L) - \alpha c - (1 - \alpha)(pq_L + \phi(r) - sq_L). \quad (3)$$

Finally, regulator compensation  $s$  is determined by the condition that the marginal worker is indifferent between regulation and banking. Since we are looking at the case in which some young workers start in each of the two sectors, the marginal worker is young, and the indifference condition is

$$s = p - \frac{\Delta_y - \phi(r)}{\tilde{q}}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\tilde{q} = q_H$  if the marginal worker has high skill, and  $\tilde{q} = q_L$  otherwise.<sup>19</sup> Substitution of (4) into (3) gives the benefit of regulation  $\Delta_y$  in terms of  $p$ ,  $\phi(r)$ , and the underlying parameters of the model.<sup>20</sup> A large enough human capital gain  $\theta$  ensures that  $\Delta_y$ , the benefit of starting in regulation, is positive. Moreover, a large enough  $\theta$  and a small enough benefit from misbehaving,  $\phi(r)$ , satisfy our conjecture that  $\Delta_y > \phi(r)$ .

<sup>19</sup>For conciseness, we ignore the case in which all high-skill young workers are bankers and all low-skill young workers are regulators.

<sup>20</sup>Evaluating,  $\Delta_y = \frac{\theta p(q_H - q_L) - (\alpha + \theta)c - (1 - \alpha - \theta)\left(1 - \frac{q_L}{\tilde{q}}\right)\phi(r)}{1 + \frac{q_L}{\tilde{q}}(1 - \alpha - \theta)}$ .

Equations (3) and (4) yield the comparative statics

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Delta_y}{\partial p} &= \theta (q_H - q_L) \\ \frac{\partial \Delta_y}{\partial \theta} &= \frac{pq_H + \phi(r) - c - sq_L}{1 + \frac{q_L}{q} (1 - \alpha - \theta)}.\end{aligned}$$

Since  $\Delta_y$  is positive only if  $pq_H + \phi(r) - c - sq_L$  is, the gain  $\Delta_y$  to starting in regulation is consequently increasing in both the profitability of banking and the skill-gain  $\theta$  associated with starting in regulation.

We conclude by revisiting our initial assumption that a worker's skill level is uncorrelated over time. Now, assume instead that workers who are high-skilled when young have a higher probability,  $\alpha_H$  say, of being high-skilled when old. From expression (3), one can see that this assumption would result in  $\Delta_y$  varying with the worker's type when young. The assumption that  $\alpha_H > \alpha$  implies that high-skill young workers would benefit *less* from working in regulation than before. To see this, observe that (3) is decreasing in  $\alpha$  by inequality (2): the cost of switching to banking when an old worker has high skill exceeds the compensation disadvantage of a low-skill old-worker remaining in regulation. Consequently, a positive correlation of skill over time would actually reinforce our results relating to the allocation of low-skill workers to regulation, though at the cost of moving us away from the baseline model in which the benefit of working in regulation is independent of type.

Finally, as noted we have analyzed the dynamic model under the assumption of risk neutrality, where adverse selection has no impact (see Lemma 2). However, it is worth noting that the combination of risk-adverse workers and unobservable skills might generate a partially countervailing effect in which starting in regulation is a negative signal, making promotion to banking more difficult; we leave a fuller exploration of this effect for future research.

## 6 Robustness

For transparency and analytical tractability, we have made the simplifying assumptions that there are just two skill levels and that workers are homogeneous with respect to the intrinsic benefit

of working in regulation. The assumption of two skill levels is easily relaxed under either risk neutrality or full-observability of skill, and our results generalize exactly as one would expect, but generate no significant new insights: there is a cutoff skill-level above which workers are bankers, and below which they work for regulatory agencies.

Similarly, the assumption of homogeneity of the intrinsic benefit is easily relaxed in these same cases: what matters is then the intrinsic benefit of the worker who is indifferent between the two occupations, and provided this “marginal-type” intrinsic benefit is positive, our results are qualitatively unchanged.<sup>21</sup> Economically, the intrinsic benefit of the marginal worker is positive whenever the number of workers in the economy who derive an intrinsic benefit from regulation exceeds the equilibrium number of regulators. When this condition is met, regulators have relatively low skill, as in the homogenous benefit case. Moreover, heterogeneity implies that, in equilibrium, most regulators strictly prefer their job to working in banking, since their intrinsic benefit exceeds that of the marginal type. A final point worth making in this regard is that a worker’s intrinsic utility from regulation is likely to be negatively correlated with the same worker’s net benefit from misbehaving as a banker. For example, a worker who values public service may well suffer disutility from misbehaving as a banker. Negative correlation of this type makes Assumption 2 more likely to hold.

One special but important case of heterogeneity in the intrinsic benefit is that in which regulators care about how many useful reports they produce. In other words, the intrinsic benefit may be partially output-dependent, instead of completely output-independent as we have previously assumed. If regulators place a value  $d$  on useful reports, the total intrinsic benefit of a worker of skill  $i \in \{H, L\}$  is  $\bar{\Delta} + q_i d$ , where  $\bar{\Delta}$  is the output-independent component. The next proposition shows that the addition of the output-dependent component  $q_i d$  to the intrinsic benefit does not change our model’s prediction that whenever the fixed benefit of regulation,  $\bar{\Delta}$ , is larger than the net gain from misbehavior,  $\phi(r)$ , regulators hire high-skill workers only after they have completely exhausted the supply of low-skill workers and some regulatory budget remains.

---

<sup>21</sup>Generalizing our model in the case of risk aversion and asymmetric information about skill is considerably harder. In particular, establishing equilibrium existence for more than two skill levels becomes significantly harder; while dealing with two dimensions of unobserved type—i.e., both skill and intrinsic benefit—would introduce substantial extra complexity.

**Proposition 8** *In any equilibrium with  $\bar{\Delta} > \phi(r)$ , bankers are more skilled than regulators. Formally, there is no equilibrium in which some high-skill workers are regulators ( $\alpha^H < 1$ ) and some low-skill workers are bankers ( $\alpha^L > 0$ ).*

Moreover, an identical argument implies that this result is also robust to the gains from misbehavior  $\phi(r)$  being linearly dependant of a worker's skill  $q_i$ . Specifically, in any equilibrium where the fixed benefit of regulation,  $\bar{\Delta}$ , is larger than the fixed component of gains from misbehavior, say  $\overline{\phi(r)}$ , regulators hire high-skill workers only after they have completely exhausted the supply of low-skill workers and some regulatory budget remains.

We have also made the assumption of free-entry by banks, resulting in bankers extracting the whole equilibrium surplus  $p$ . Different assumptions on the industrial organization of the banking sector could result in bankers extracting only a fraction of the surplus and the banks that employ them extracting the remaining surplus. It is straightforward to see that all our qualitative results hold when bankers only extract some fraction  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  of the expected payoff from financing projects. Regulatory agencies still find it optimal to hire the low-skill workers first. However, there is a *quantitative* shift in the equilibrium outcome as regulatory agencies now pay lower compensation and attract more of the low-skill workers away from the banking sector, leading to a larger regulatory sector and less misbehavior by bankers.

Note finally that our results rely on some substitutability between workers of different skill levels. Clearly if no such substitution is possible, then the skill mix in the two occupations is essentially technologically determined. For analytical convenience we have assumed perfect substitutability, but this is not essential for our results.

## 7 Conclusion

We propose a labor market model in which workers with heterogenous ability levels can choose to work as bankers, investing in projects with risky payoffs, or as regulators, monitoring the behavior of bankers. The model allows us to shed some light on the interactions between the financial labor market, the profitability of the financial sector, and its degree of misbehavior. We assume that

the intrinsic benefit from working as a regulator (e.g., recognition for being a public servant) is greater than the ex ante benefit a banker can expect to extract through fraud or other types of misbehavior. Our model jointly endogenizes the occupational choice of workers and the compensation contracts offered in the two sectors. Bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more sensitive to performance. We show that when the financial sector booms banks draw the best workers away from the regulatory sector and equilibrium misbehavior by bankers increases. In a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking mid-career.

Our analysis provides insights for policy makers in the government and in financial regulatory agencies about the competitive labor market forces at play. Our model shows that increasing the budget of regulatory agencies would not prevent a situation where bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators. Allocating more resources to these regulatory agencies would allow them to increase the quantity of supervision they provide as they would hire away from banks some of their less skilled workers. These workers, when considering the compensation regulatory agencies need to pay them, would be the most productive workers to hire away from the banking sector and consequently the skill inequality between the regulatory sector and the banking sector would persist despite the larger regulatory budgets. Regulatory agencies prioritizing the hiring of low-skill workers is socially efficient in our model when the intrinsic benefits from working in regulation are large enough. It is, however, important to highlight that the intrinsic benefits that trigger this skill inequality improve the productivity of the regulatory sector, thanks to the resulting savings in labor costs, and regulatory agencies should not try to eliminate them.

The appropriate regulation of financial markets has long been a topic of considerable importance. This paper adds to the existing literature by analyzing what worker skill levels are best suited to financial regulation, both positively and normatively. It is worth noting that although we have focused on financial regulation, our results potentially apply to other sectors of the economy where regulation and the primary activity being regulated require broadly similar knowledge and training.<sup>22</sup> Regulation of offshore oil production is one obvious and important example.

---

<sup>22</sup>For example, for the most part we do *not* think our model applies well to police and house burglars.

## A Appendix

**Proof of Lemma 1:** Suppose to the contrary that an equilibrium exists in which banks extract strictly positive expected profits from a worker of type  $i$ . Let  $w_B^L$  and  $w_B^H$  be the equilibrium banking contracts.

There cannot be an equilibrium in which a bank expects strictly positive profits from both types, i.e.,  $\Pi^L(w_B^L) > 0$  and  $\Pi^H(w_B^H) > 0$ , since in this case a bank can profitably deviate by making both contracts slightly more attractive and capturing the whole market. So the bank must make weakly negative profits from type  $j \neq i$ . (This includes the case in which all workers of type  $j$  are in regulation.)

Next, let  $\tilde{w}_B^i$  be a single contract that strictly improves the utility of type  $i$  relative to  $w_B^i$ , but strictly worsens the utility of type  $j$  relative to  $w_B^i$ . Because the success probabilities differ, one can always construct such a contract, and moreover, can ensure that the profits  $\Pi^i(\tilde{w}_B^i)$  are arbitrarily close to the profits  $\Pi^i(w_B^i) > 0$ . It is then a strictly profitable deviation for a bank to offer a single contract,  $\tilde{w}_B^i$ , in place of the menu of contracts,  $\{w_B^H, w_B^L\}$ , as follows. By construction, type  $i$  accepts the contract, and  $\Pi^i(\tilde{w}_B^i) > 0$ . Moreover, type  $j$  does not accept the contract, since in the conjectured equilibrium he is at most indifferent between selecting  $w_B^i$  and some other contract, which remains available; and  $U^j(\tilde{w}_B^i) < U^j(w_B^i)$ . The existence of a strictly profitable deviation contradicts the equilibrium definition, and establishes the result.

A similar proof by contradiction applies for regulatory agencies and the productivity per dollar of their workers. ■

**Proof of Proposition 1:** See paragraph that precedes proposition. ■

**Proof of Proposition 2:** For each possible number of bankers  $n \in (0, 1 + \eta)$ , we construct a candidate equilibrium that satisfies all the equilibrium conditions other than the regulatory budget constraint. We then calculate the regulatory sector's total compensation bill in each candidate equilibrium. Finally, we use a version of the intermediate-value theorem to show that at least one candidate equilibrium satisfies the regulatory budget constraint.

For each candidate number of bankers  $n$ , Proposition 1 determines the skill levels of all bankers

and regulators, i.e., all bankers are high-skilled if  $n \leq \eta$ , all regulators are low-skilled if  $n \geq \eta$ . Given the allocation of workers, it is straightforward to compute the misbehavior detection probability  $r$ . *Candidate equilibrium for  $n \in (0, \eta)$ , when marginal worker has high skill.* From Lemma 1, high-skill bankers receive expected compensation of  $q_H p$ . Since some high-skill workers are employed by regulatory agencies, the expected compensation of high-skill regulators is  $q_H s$ , where  $s = p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_H}$ , and hence (by Lemma 1) the expected compensation of low-skill regulators is  $q_L s$ . The bank and regulatory agency equilibrium conditions are satisfied since if either employer reduces compensation for workers of type  $i$ , it will lose type- $i$  workers (for regulatory agencies this is a bad outcome since productivity is the same across the two worker types); and banks cannot profitably poach low-skill workers, since it would have to pay them expected compensation of  $q_L s + \Delta - \phi(r) > q_L p$ . Finally, if the above expected compensations are delivered by the simple contracts  $(w_{BS}^i, w_{BF}^i) = (p, 0)$  and  $(w_{RS}^i, w_{RF}^i) = (s, 0)$  for types  $i = H, L$ , the self-selection equilibrium condition is satisfied since, by construction, high-skill workers are indifferent, i.e.,  $q_H s + \Delta = q_H p + \phi(r)$ , and so low-skill workers strictly prefer the regulation contract since  $p > s$  (by Assumption 2).

*Candidate equilibrium for  $n \in (\eta, 1 + \eta)$ , when marginal worker has low skill.* From Lemma 1, high- and low-skill bankers receive expected compensation of  $q_H p$  and  $q_L p$  respectively. Since some low-skill workers are employed by regulatory agencies, the expected compensation of low-skill regulators is  $q_L s$ , where  $s = p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_L}$ . The bank and regulatory agency equilibrium conditions are satisfied since if either employer reduces compensation for workers of type  $i$ , it will lose type- $i$  workers; and regulatory agencies cannot profitably poach high-skill workers, since it would have to pay them expected compensation of  $q_H p - (\Delta - \phi(r)) > q_H s$ , meaning productivity is lower than for the existing low-skilled regulators. Finally, if the above expected compensations are delivered by the simple contracts  $(w_{BS}^i, w_{BF}^i) = (p, 0)$  and  $(w_{RS}^i, w_{RF}^i) = (s, 0)$  for types  $i = H, L$ , the self-selection equilibrium condition is satisfied since, by construction, low-skill workers are indifferent,  $q_L s + \Delta = q_L p + \phi(r)$ , and so high-skill workers strictly prefer the banking contract since  $p > s$  (by Assumption 2).

*Candidate equilibrium for  $n = \eta$ , with complete separation of types.* From Lemma 1, high-skill

bankers receive expected compensation of  $q_H p$ . For low-skill regulators, any expected compensation

$$q_L s \in \left[ q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_L} \right), q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_H} \right) \right]$$

is a candidate equilibrium outcome, as follows. The lower end of this interval is exactly the expected compensation that makes it impossible for banks to profitably poach low-skill regulators. Likewise, the upper end of the interval is exactly the expected compensation that makes it impossible for regulatory agencies to gain by replacing their low-skill workers with high-skill workers poached from banks. Finally, if the above expected compensations are delivered by the simple contracts  $(w_{BS}^i, w_{BF}^i) = (p, 0)$  and  $(w_{RS}^i, w_{RF}^i) = (s, 0)$  for types  $i = H, L$ , the self-selection equilibrium condition is satisfied since, high-skill workers do not become regulators and low-skill workers do not become bankers:  $q_H p + \phi(r) \geq q_H s + \Delta$  and  $q_L p + \phi(r) \leq q_L s + \Delta$ .

*Equilibrium existence.* For any  $n$ , let  $W(n)$  be the total regulatory compensation bill associated with the candidate equilibrium characterized above. Since for  $n = \eta$  the candidate equilibrium is not unique, in this case  $W(n)$  is a set. Hence  $W$  defines a correspondence from  $(0, 1 + \eta)$  into  $\mathfrak{R}$ . Substituting in the above characterization of candidate equilibria,

$$W(n) = \begin{cases} \left\{ \left( (\eta - n) q_H + q_L \right) \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_H} \right) \right\} & \text{if } n < \eta \\ \left\{ q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{\tilde{q}} \right) : \tilde{q} \in [q_L, q_H] \right\} & \text{if } n = \eta \\ \left\{ (1 - (n - \eta)) q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_L} \right) \right\} & \text{if } n > \eta \end{cases}$$

By Assumption 1,  $\lim_{n \rightarrow 0} W(n) > M$ . Moreover,  $\lim_{n \rightarrow 1 + \eta} W(n) = 0$ , since in this case regulatory agencies do not employ anyone (and compensation is bounded, since banker compensation is bounded). Since the detection probability  $r$  and hence  $\phi(r)$  are continuous in  $n$ , the function  $W(n)$  is continuous over each of  $(0, \eta)$  and  $(\eta, 1 + \eta)$ . Moreover,  $W(\eta) = \left[ q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_L} \right), q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_H} \right) \right]$ ,  $\lim_{n \nearrow \eta} W(n) = q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_H} \right)$  and  $\lim_{n \searrow \eta} W(n) = q_L \left( p - \frac{\Delta - \phi(r)}{q_L} \right)$ . So by an obvious extension of the intermediate-value theorem,<sup>23</sup> there exists  $n \in (0, 1 + \eta)$  such that  $M \in W(n)$ . ■

<sup>23</sup>More formally,  $W$  is upper hemi-continuous, and Lemma 4.1 of John (1999) applies.

**Proof of Lemma 2:** “Only if” is immediate from the fact that, given risk neutrality, both banks and regulatory agencies are able to offer contracts that are accepted by only one type, and deliver arbitrary utility to a worker without entailing any inefficiency. For the “if” part, note that Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 hold for full-information economies also. The fact that any equilibrium outcome of the full-information economy can also be supported as the equilibrium outcome of the asymmetric information economy then follows from the proof of Proposition 2. ■

**Proof of Proposition 3:** Fix a decentralized equilibrium. Write  $r$  for the equilibrium detection probability, and  $n$  for the equilibrium number of bankers. By Lemma 1, there is an  $s$  such that worker type  $i$  gets  $pq_i + \phi(r)$  as a banker and  $sq_i + \Delta$  as a regulator. Observe that  $s > 0$ , since otherwise regulatory agencies would attract all workers.

Suppose that, contrary to the claimed result, there exists a Pareto superior alternative allocation. Relative to the decentralized equilibrium, in the new allocation,  $\varepsilon_L$  and  $\varepsilon_H$  low- and high-skill workers are moved from banking to regulation; and  $\delta_L$  and  $\delta_H$  low- and high-skill workers are moved from regulation to banking. Arbitrary payments are allowed in the new allocation, subject to the constraint that total payments to regulators equal  $M$ .

Write  $A$  for the increase in utility experienced by the subset of workers who are regulators in the *new* allocation. By the supposition that the new allocation is Pareto superior,  $A \geq 0$ . In the new allocation, the combined utility of these workers is simply

$$M + \left(1 + \eta - n - \sum_i \delta_i + \sum_i \varepsilon_i\right) \Delta.$$

In the decentralized equilibrium, the  $\varepsilon_i$  workers of type  $i$  who were switched, for the alternative allocation, from banking to regulation received  $pq_i + \phi(r)$ , while the  $1 + \eta - n - \sum_i \delta_i$  who are regulators in both the new and old allocations received a combined utility of

$$M - \sum_i \delta_i sq_i + \left(1 + \eta - n - \sum_i \delta_i\right) \Delta.$$

So

$$\begin{aligned}
A &= M + \left(1 + \eta - n - \sum_i \delta_i + \sum_i \varepsilon_i\right) \Delta - \sum_i \varepsilon_i (pq_i + \phi(r)) \\
&\quad - \left(M - \sum_i \delta_i sq_i + \left(1 + \eta - n - \sum_i \delta_i\right) \Delta\right)
\end{aligned}$$

which simplifies to

$$A = \sum_i \delta_i sq_i - \sum_i \varepsilon_i (pq_i + \phi(r) - \Delta). \quad (5)$$

Observe that  $\varepsilon_i > 0$  is possible only if the decentralized equilibrium featured type- $i$  workers in banking; but in this case,  $pq_i + \phi(r) \geq \Delta + sq_i$ , since otherwise a regulatory agency could strictly increase its number of useful reports by deviating and offering a contract that would attract these workers away from banking. Consequently,  $\sum_i \delta_i sq_i - \sum_i \varepsilon_i sq_i \geq A \geq 0$ , and so the number of useful reports must be lower in the new allocation, i.e.,

$$(\varepsilon_H - \delta_H) q_H + (\varepsilon_L - \delta_L) q_L \leq 0. \quad (6)$$

In the decentralized equilibrium either all low-skill workers are in regulation, or all high-skill workers are in banking. Consequently, either  $\varepsilon_L = 0$  or  $\delta_H = 0$ , and so inequality (6) implies that the new allocation has more bankers,  $\sum_i \varepsilon_i - \sum_i \delta_i \leq 0$ .

Write  $n' = n - \sum_i (\varepsilon_i - \delta_i)$  for the number of bankers in the new allocation, and  $r'$  for the misbehavior detection probability in the new allocation. As noted, the new allocation has more bankers,  $n' \geq n$ ; and since there are more bankers and fewer useful reports, the new detection rate is lower,  $r' \leq r$ , given the properties of  $G$ .

Write  $\Psi(n, r)$  for the net total social cost of misbehavior, i.e., the social harm of misbehavior and the social cost of penalties imposed on bankers net of the gains experienced by bankers. Note that  $\Psi(n, r)$  depends on the number of bankers,  $n$ , and the misbehavior detection probability,  $r$ ; and in particular, the social cost of misbehavior is higher in the new allocation,  $\Psi(n', r') \geq \Psi(n, r)$ .

Consider the sum of all utilities in the economy. In the decentralized equilibrium this is

$$(\eta\alpha^H q_H + \alpha^L q_L) p + M + (1 + \eta - n) \Delta - \Psi(n, r),$$

where the first term is monetary payments to bankers, the second term is monetary payments to regulators, and the third term is the total intrinsic utility received by regulators. So the sum of utilities in the new allocation is

$$\begin{aligned} & \left( \eta\alpha^H q_H + \alpha^L q_L + \sum_i (\delta_i - \varepsilon_i) q_i \right) p + M + (1 + \eta - n') \Delta - \Psi(n', r') \\ = & (\eta\alpha^H q_H + \alpha^L q_L) p + M + (1 + \eta - n) \Delta + \sum_i (\delta_i - \varepsilon_i) (pq_i - \Delta) - \Psi(n', r'). \end{aligned}$$

Hence the change in the sum of utilities is

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_i (\delta_i - \varepsilon_i) (pq_i - \Delta) - (\Psi(n', r') - \Psi(n, r)) \\ = & A + \sum_i \delta_i (pq_i - \Delta - sq_i) + \sum_i \varepsilon_i \phi(r) - (\Psi(n', r') - \Psi(n, r)), \end{aligned}$$

where the equality follows from (5).

Observe that  $\delta_i > 0$  is possible only if the decentralized equilibrium featured type- $i$  workers in regulation; but in this case,  $pq_i + \phi(r) \leq \Delta + sq_i$ , since otherwise a bank could make strictly positive profits by deviating and offering a contract that would attract these workers away from regulation. So the change in the sum of utilities is bounded above by

$$A + \sum_i (\varepsilon_i - \delta_i) \phi(r) - (\Psi(n', r') - \Psi(n, r)).$$

From above,  $\sum_i (\varepsilon_i - \delta_i) \leq 0$  and  $\Psi(n', r') \geq \Psi(n, r)$ . Consequently, the change in the sum of utilities is smaller than the utility gain experienced by regulators in the *new* allocation,  $A$ . Therefore, the sum of utilities for workers who are not regulators in the new allocation is lower than in the decentralized equilibrium, and is strictly so whenever the (new allocation) regulators are strictly better off (i.e.,  $A > 0$ ) in the new allocation. But this contradicts the supposition that

the new allocation is a Pareto improvement, completing the proof. ■

**Proof of Proposition 4:** Suppose to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists. Consider first the deviation in which a bank offers the contract  $(\tilde{w}_{BS}, \tilde{w}_{BF}) = (w_{RS}^H + \tau + \varepsilon_S, w_{RF}^H + \tau - \varepsilon_F)$ , where  $\tau$  is such that, if  $\varepsilon_S = \varepsilon_F = 0$ , the new contract gives *any* worker exactly the same utility as the regulator contract  $(w_{RS}^H, w_{RF}^H)$  gives, i.e.,  $u(w + \tau) \Phi(r) = u(w + \Delta)$  for all  $w$ . (The existence of such a contract follows from CARA preferences.) Hence  $\tau$  satisfies

$$\Delta - \tau = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r). \quad (7)$$

For use below, note that, from the condition stated in the proposition,  $\tau > 0$ : in words, if offered the same compensation, workers prefer regulation to banking, and so a bank must raise compensation by  $\tau$  above that of a regulatory agency if it is to offer the same utility. Choose  $\varepsilon_S$  and  $\varepsilon_F$  such that the new contract offers strictly more utility to high-skill workers but strictly less utility to low-skill workers than the regulator contract  $(w_{RS}^H, w_{RF}^H)$ . Consequently, high-skill workers in regulation will accept this contract, while no low-skill workers will accept this contract, since it is strictly worse than a contract they already reject.

By supposition, the original set of contracts is an equilibrium, and so any deviation of the type just described must deliver weakly negative profits for the bank offering it, i.e.,  $q_H \tilde{w}_{BS} + (1 - q_H) \tilde{w}_{BF} \geq q_H p$ . If that was not the case, the original set of contracts could not be part of an equilibrium. It follows that

$$q_H w_{RS}^H + (1 - q_H) w_{RF}^H + \tau \geq q_H p. \quad (8)$$

Next, consider a deviation by a regulatory agency to  $(\tilde{w}_{RS}, \tilde{w}_{RF}) = (w_{BS}^L - \tau - \varepsilon'_S, w_{BF}^L - \tau + \varepsilon'_F)$ , where  $\tau$  is defined in (7) above. Given CARA utility,  $u(w) \Phi(r) = u(w - \tau + \Delta)$  for all  $w$ . Consequently, when  $\varepsilon'_S = \varepsilon'_F = 0$ , the new contract offers exactly the same utility as the bank contract  $(w_{BS}^L, w_{BF}^L)$ . Let  $\varepsilon'_S$  and  $\varepsilon'_F$  be such that the new contract offers strictly more utility to low-skill workers but strictly less utility to high-skill workers than the banker contract  $(w_{BS}^L, w_{BF}^L)$ . Consequently, low-skill workers working in banking will accept this contract, while no high-skill worker

will accept this contract, since it is strictly worse than a contract they already reject.

The productivity of this deviation contract (i.e., useful reports per dollar spent in expectation) is  $\frac{q_L}{q_L \bar{w}_{RS} + (1 - q_L) \bar{w}_{RF}}$ . By setting  $\varepsilon'_S$  and  $\varepsilon'_F$  small, this can be made arbitrarily close to

$$\frac{q_L}{q_L w_{BS}^L + (1 - q_L) w_{BF}^L - \tau}. \quad (9)$$

By supposition  $(w_{BS}^L, w_{BF}^L)$  is an equilibrium contract, and since  $\alpha^L > 0$ , is accepted by some low-skill workers. So the zero-profit condition for banks implies that the ratio (9) equals  $\frac{q_L}{q_L p - \tau}$ , which since  $\tau > 0$  is strictly greater than  $\frac{q_H}{q_H p - \tau}$ , which by (8) is weakly greater than  $\frac{q_H}{q_H w_{RS}^H + (1 - q_H) w_{RF}^H}$ , the productivity of the equilibrium contract for high-skill regulators,  $(w_{RS}^H, w_{RF}^H)$ . Hence there exists a deviation that strictly raises the regulatory agency's productivity, contradicting the supposition that the original set of contracts was an equilibrium, and completing the proof. ■

**Proof of Proposition 5:** The main text deals with the cases in which both types of worker are employed by banks, and in which both types of worker are employed by regulatory agencies. The only remaining case is that all regulators have low skill, and all bankers have high skill. Suppose that, contrary to the claimed result, the banking contracts have fixed compensation, i.e.,  $w_{BS}^H = w_{BF}^H = w_B^H$ . From the main text, low-skill regulators have fixed compensation, i.e.,  $w_{RS}^L = w_{RF}^L = w_R^L$ . So for both worker types  $i = L, H$ ,  $U^i(w_B^H) = u(w_B^H) \Phi(r)$  and  $U^i(w_R^L) = u(w_R^L) e^{-\gamma \Delta}$ . Since these utilities are independent of a worker's type, they must equal one another, since otherwise all workers would be either bankers, or all would be regulators. But then a regulatory agency could strictly increase its productivity by offering fixed compensation just above  $w_R^L$  and attracting both types of worker. ■

**Proof of Proposition 6:** The structure of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. For each  $n \in (0, 1 + \eta)$ , we construct a candidate equilibrium. We also show that, for any  $n \neq \eta$ , the candidate equilibrium is unique; this matters for comparative statics, though not for equilibrium existence. We then calculate the regulatory sector's total compensation bill for each possible number of bankers  $n$ . Finally, we use a version of the intermediate-value theorem to show that at least one candidate equilibrium exists. The only equilibrium condition we then need to check is

that there is no “pooling” deviation in which an employer offers an alternate contract that attracts *both* types of workers, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Finally, the comparative statics follow straightforwardly from the mapping used to establish equilibrium existence.

We start by considering, in turn, the cases  $n \in (0, \eta)$  and  $n \in (\eta, 1 + \eta)$ . As in the proof of Proposition 2 we construct a correspondence  $W : (0, 1 + \eta) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  giving the total regulatory agency compensation bill for each candidate number of bankers  $n$ .

*Candidate equilibrium for  $n \in (0, \eta)$ , when marginal worker has high skill.* When the number of bankers  $n < \eta$ , all bankers have high skill. So the contracts accepted in equilibrium are  $w_R^L$ ,  $w_R^H$ ,  $w_B^H$ . From the text prior to Proposition 5,  $w_{RS}^L = w_{RF}^L$ . From Lemma 1,  $\rho^H(w_R^H) = \rho^L(w_R^L)$  and  $\Pi^H(w_B^H) = 0$ . Any equilibrium must have  $U^H(w_B^H) = U^H(w_R^H)$ . By standard arguments,  $U^L(w_R^L) = U^L(w_R^H)$ ,  $U^L(w_R^L) = U^L(w_B^H)$ ,  $w_{RS}^H > w_{RF}^H$  and  $w_{BS}^H > w_{BF}^H$ : in brief, if these conditions are not satisfied, an employer could deviate and offer an alternative contract that is accepted by high-skill workers and that would cost the employer strictly less than the existing high-skill worker contract.

We next explicitly solve for the contract  $w_R^L$ . Note that  $U^i(w_B^H) = U^i(w_R^H)$  for both worker types  $i = H, L$ . Expanding, for  $i = L, H$

$$q_i \left( u(w_{RS}^H) e^{-\gamma \Delta} - u(w_{BS}^H) \Phi(r) \right) + (1 - q_i) \left( u(w_{RF}^H) e^{-\gamma \Delta} - u(w_{BF}^H) \Phi(r) \right) = 0.$$

Since  $q_H \neq q_L$ , it follows that for outcomes  $\chi = S, F$ ,  $u(w_{R\chi}^H) e^{-\gamma \Delta} = u(w_{B\chi}^H) \Phi(r)$ , or equivalently (given CARA preferences),  $w_{R\chi}^H + \Delta = w_{B\chi}^H - \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)$ . Given  $\Pi^H(w_B^H) = 0$ , we then have

$$q_H w_{RS}^H + (1 - q_H) w_{RF}^H = q_H w_{BS}^H + (1 - q_H) w_{BF}^H - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right) = q_H p - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right).$$

The constraint  $\rho^H(w_R^H) = \rho^L(w_R^L)$  can then be rewritten as

$$\frac{q_L}{w_R^L} = \frac{q_H}{q_H p - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)},$$

and so

$$w_R^L = q_L p - \frac{q_L}{q_H} \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right). \quad (10)$$

The contract  $w_B^H$  is then determined by the (unique) solution to  $\Pi^H(w_B^H) = 0$  and  $U^L(w_R^L) = U^L(w_B^H)$  such that  $w_{BS}^H > w_{BF}^H$ . The contract  $w_R^H$  is then given by  $w_{R\chi}^H = w_{B\chi}^H - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)$  for  $\chi = S, F$ .

Note that a bank would have to pay at least  $w_R^L + \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)$  to poach a low-skilled worker from a regulatory agency, which is unprofitable, since this amount exceeds  $q_L p$ . Consequently, we have satisfied all the equilibrium conditions except budget balancing for the regulatory agency and deviations designed to attract both worker types; we check these conditions below.

The total compensation bill of the regulatory sector is  $W(n) = (\eta - n) (q_H w_{RS}^H + (1 - q_H) w_{RF}^H) + w_R^L$ .

*Candidate equilibrium for  $n \in (\eta, 1 + \eta)$ , when marginal worker has low skill.* When the number of bankers  $n > \eta$ , all regulators have low skill. So the contracts accepted in equilibrium are  $w_R^L, w_B^L, w_B^H$ . From the text prior to Proposition 5,  $w_{RS}^L = w_{RF}^L$  and  $w_{BS}^L = w_{BF}^L$ . From Lemma 1,  $\Pi^H(w_B^H) = \Pi^L(w_B^L) = 0$ , and so in particular  $w_B^L = q_L p$ . Any equilibrium must have  $U^L(w_B^L) = U^L(w_R^L)$ , which implies  $w_R^L = w_B^L - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)$ . As in the case  $n \in (0, \eta)$ , by standard arguments,  $U^L(w_B^L) = U^L(w_B^H)$ , and  $w_{BS}^H > w_{BF}^H$ .

Note that a regulatory agency would have to pay at least  $q_H w_{BS}^H + (1 - q_H) w_{BF}^H - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right) = q_H p - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)$  to poach a high-skill worker from a bank. This would give a productivity of  $\frac{q_H}{q_H p - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)} < \frac{q_L}{q_L p - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)}$ , which is the productivity the regulatory agency obtains from its existing low-skill workers. Consequently, we have satisfied all the equilibrium conditions except budget balancing for the regulatory agency and deviations designed to attract both worker types; we check these conditions below.

In this case, the total compensation bill of the regulatory sector is  $W(n) = (1 + \eta - n) w_{RS}^L$ .

*Candidate equilibrium for  $n = \eta$ , with complete separation of types.* When the number of bankers  $n = \eta$ , all bankers have high skill and all regulators have low skill. So the contracts accepted in equilibrium are  $w_R^L$  and  $w_B^H$ . Any equilibrium must have  $w_{RS}^L = w_{RF}^L$  and  $\Pi^H(w_B^H) = 0$ , and

by the same standard arguments as above,  $U^L(w_R^L) = U^L(w_B^H)$  and  $w_{BS}^H > w_{BF}^H$ . The main complication in this case is that we have just three equations to determine four contract terms. Consequently, there is indeterminacy in the candidate equilibrium.

Define  $\bar{w}_R^L = q_L p - \frac{q_L}{q_H} \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)$  and  $\underline{w}_R^L = q_L p - \left( \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r) \right)$ . (Note that  $\bar{w}_R^L$  and  $\underline{w}_R^L$  are the limiting values of  $w_R^L$  as  $n$  approaches  $\eta$  from below and above, respectively.)

Observe that a bank can profitably poach a low-skill regulator if and only if  $w_R^L < \underline{w}_R^L$ . Similarly, the expected compensation necessary for a regulatory agency to poach a high-skill banker is  $\frac{q_H}{q_L} \bar{w}_R^L$ , and so a regulatory agency can increase productivity by poaching a high-skill banker if and only if  $w_R^L > \bar{w}_R^L$ .

It follows that when  $n = \eta$ , the set of candidate equilibria is given by any  $w_R^L \in [\underline{w}_R^L, \bar{w}_R^L]$ , together with  $\Pi^H(w_B^H) = 0$ ,  $U^L(w_R^L) = U^L(w_B^H)$ , and  $w_{BS}^H > w_{BF}^H$ . The regulatory agency compensation bill correspondence is  $W(\eta) = [\underline{w}_R^L, \bar{w}_R^L]$ .

*Equilibrium existence.* By exactly the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2, there exists  $n$  such that  $M \in W(n)$ . The associated contracts constitute a candidate equilibrium in which no bank or regulatory agency can profitably deviate by offering a contract that is accepted by just one type. It remains to check that there is no profitable deviation involving a contract that is accepted by both types. The most profitable deviation of this type entails a full-insurance contract, since workers are strictly risk averse. It is straightforward to show that high-skill workers strictly prefer their contracts to the low-skill worker contracts in the candidate equilibrium. So the deviation must entail a discrete increase in the utility of low-skill workers. So the deviation results in losses from the low-skill workers who accept it. Provided the fraction of high-skill workers  $\eta$  is sufficiently small, it follows that the deviation is unprofitable. ■

**Proof of Proposition 7:** We use  $B \equiv w_{BS}^H - w_{BF}^H > 0$  to denote the high-skill banker's performance bonus. The high-skill banker is paid  $w_{BF}^H$  with probability  $1 - q_H$  and  $w_{BF}^H + B$  with probability  $q_H$ . We know expected compensation must equal expected profits, and so  $w_{BF}^H + q_H B = q_H p$ , or equivalently,

$$w_{BF}^H = q_H (p - B). \quad (11)$$

Now, consider an improvement in the success payoff of banking projects (i.e.,  $dp > 0$ ). From Corollary 2, the equilibrium misbehavior detection probability falls, i.e.,  $dr < 0$ . We will establish  $dB > 0$ .

If  $n \in (0, \eta)$  and the marginal worker has high skill,  $w_{BF}^H$  and  $B$  are determined by (11) together with the low-skill worker indifference condition

$$(1 - q_L) u(w_{BF}^H) + q_L u(w_{BF}^H + B) = u(w_R^L) \frac{e^{-\gamma \Delta}}{\Phi(r)},$$

where  $w_R^L$  is given by equation (10) in the proof of Proposition 6. Substituting in (11) and rewriting the righthand side yields

$$(1 - q_L) u(q_H(p - B)) + q_L u(q_H p + (1 - q_H)B) = u\left(w_R^L + \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)\right).$$

Substituting in for  $w_R^L$ , the change  $dp$  and associated changes  $dB$  and  $dr$  must satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} & q_H(1 - q_L) u'(w_{BF}^H) (dp - dB) + q_L u'(w_{BF}^H + B) (q_H dp + (1 - q_H) dB) \\ = & u'\left(w_R^L + \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)\right) \left( q_L dp + \left(1 - \frac{q_L}{q_H}\right) \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\Phi'(r)}{\Phi(r)} dr \right). \end{aligned}$$

Given CARA preferences, we know  $(1 - q_L) u'(w_{BF}^H) + q_L u'(w_{BF}^H + B) = u'\left(w_R^L + \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)\right)$ .

Given  $q_H > q_L$ ,  $\Phi'(r) \geq 0$ ,  $dp > 0$  and  $dr < 0$ , it follows that

$$(-q_H(1 - q_L) u'(w_{BF}^H) + q_L(1 - q_H) u'(w_{BF}^H + B)) dB < 0.$$

Finally, since  $q_L(1 - q_H) < q_H(1 - q_L)$  and  $u'(w_{BF}^H + B) < u'(w_{BF}^H)$ , we obtain  $dB > 0$ .

If instead  $n \in (\eta, 1 + \eta)$  and the marginal worker has low skill,  $w_{BF}^H$  and  $B$  are determined by (11) together with the low-skill worker indifference condition

$$(1 - q_L) u(w_{BF}^H) + q_L u(w_{BF}^H + B) = u(q_L p).$$

The implication  $dB > 0$  then follows by essentially the same argument as before (in fact, the

argument is slightly simpler, since the indifference condition is simpler).

Finally, if  $n = \eta$ , we know from the proof of Proposition 6 that  $w_{BF}^H$  and  $B$  are determined by (11) together with the low-skill worker indifference condition

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - q_L) u(w_{BF}^H) + q_L u(w_{BF}^H + B) &= u(w_R^L) \frac{e^{-\gamma\Delta}}{\Phi(r)} \\ &= u\left(w_R^L + \Delta + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \Phi(r)\right), \end{aligned}$$

where  $w_R^L = M$ . The implication  $dB > 0$  again follows by essentially the same argument as before (again, the argument is actually simpler than in the case  $n < \eta$ , since  $w_R^L$  remains unchanged as it still needs to equal  $M$ ). ■

**Proof of Proposition 8:** This proof closely follows the logic of the proof for Proposition 1. Suppose that low-skill bankers and high-skill regulators coexist in equilibrium. The regulatory agency's productivity from a high-skill worker is now at most  $\frac{q_H}{q_H p - (\bar{\Delta} + q_H d - \phi(r))}$  and the regulatory agency could instead poach low-skill bankers who would give a productivity of  $\frac{q_L}{q_L p - (\bar{\Delta} + q_L d - \phi(r))}$ . Whenever  $\bar{\Delta} > \phi(r)$ , this productivity level exceeds the upper-bound on the productivity of existing high-skill regulators, implying that regulatory agencies would benefit from poaching low-skill bankers (and firing some of their existing high-skill workers). ■

## References

- Becker G., 1974, "A Theory of Social Interactions", *Journal of Political Economy* **82**, 1063-1093.
- Besley T. and M. Ghatak, 2005, "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents", *American Economic Review* **95**, 616-636.
- Bolton P. and M. Dewatripont, 2005, "Contract Theory", *MIT Press*, Cambridge, MA.
- Bolton, P., T. Santos, and J. A. Scheinkman, 2011, "Cream Skimming in Financial Markets," Working Paper, Columbia University.
- Brennan M., 1994, "Incentives, rationality, and society", *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* **7**, 31-39.
- Burgess S. and P. Metcalfe, 1999, "The Use of Incentive Schemes in the Public and Private Sectors: Evidence from British Establishments," Unpublished Working Paper, University of Bristol.
- Carlin B. and S. Gervais, 2009, "Work Ethic, Employment Contracts, and Firm Value," *Journal of Finance* **64**, 785-821.
- Delfgaauw J. and R. Dur, 2008, "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," *Economic Journal* **118**, 171-191.
- Delfgaauw J. and R. Dur, 2010, "Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management," *Journal of Public Economics*, forthcoming.
- Dewatripont M., I. Jewitt and J. Tirole, 1999, "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," *Review of Economic Studies* **66**, 199-217.
- Dixit A., 2002, "Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," *Journal of Human Resources* **37**, 696-727.
- Francois P., 2007, "Making a difference," *RAND Journal of Economics* **38**, 714-732.

- Guerrieri V., R. Shimer and R. Wright, 2010, "Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium," *Econometrica* **78**, 1823–1862.
- Jaimovich E., J. P. Rud, 2011, "Excessive Public Employment and Rent-Seeking Traps," Unpublished Working Paper, University of London.
- John R., 1999, "Abraham Wald's Equilibrium Existence Proof Reconsidered," *Economic Theory* **13**, 417-428.
- Macchiavello R., 2008, "Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures," *Journal of Development Economics* **86**, 201-213.
- Murphy, K. M., A. Schleifer and R. W. Vishny, 1991, "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* **106**, 503-530.
- Perry J. and A. Hondeghem, 2008, "Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service," *Oxford: Oxford University Press*.
- Philippon T., 2010, "Engineers vs. Financiers: Should the Financial Sector be Taxed or Subsidized," *American Economic Journal: Macro* **2**, 158-182.
- Prendergast C., 2003, "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency," *Journal of Political Economy* **111**, 929-958.
- Prendergast C., 2007, "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," *American Economic Review* **97**, 180-196.
- Povel P., R. Singh and A. Winton, 2007, "Booms, Busts, and Fraud," *Review of Financial Studies* **20**, 1219-1254.
- Rosen S., 1974, "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition," *Journal of Political Economy* **82**, 34-55.
- Rothschild M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* **90**, 629-650.